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Impact regulation in Germany and the United States
In Germany in the last 60 years there has been more
than a doubling of land that has been converted into
areas of human settlement and transport infrastruc-
ture (Wiggering et al. 2009). This is equivalent to
more than 13 percent of the national territory. As
early as 1976 it was recognized that the land con-
sumption due to development projects in transport,
building and housing is one of the most important
threats to wildlife species and their biotopes.At this
time impact regulations were introduced into
German Law. The BNatSchG (Bundesnaturschutz-
gesetz / Federal Nature Conservation Act) and since
the 1990s also the BauGB (Baugesetzbuch / Building
Code) have constituted the legal basis for impact
mitigation (Louis 2007).
To date impact regulations requiring ecological off-
set have been implemented in a few countries. Ex-
amples are regulations in the United States1 and in
Germany2.We compare the implementation of these
impact regulations in both countries to identify the
implementation characteristics that are best adapted
to the problems encountered.
Legislation in both countries provides for impact
regulation and requires mitigation measures by the
permittee (developer) as a condition of the impact
permit issuance.Both in the US and in Germany,the
following sequencing of priorities3 applies for the
regulation of impacts: prevention, minimization,
compensatory mitigation or in certain cases cash
donation as a final option.In addition,the mitigation
requirement in both countries is tied to an autho-
rization for the impact. A significant difference be-
tween the German and the American impact regula-
tion is the definition of impact. Whereas impact in
Germany represents a potential burden to nature
and landscape independent of the type of habitat
affected, impact regulation analyzed in the US only
applies to wetland damages.4 Consequently,the com-
pensatory mitigation function in the US is common-
ly referred to as “wetland mitigation”. This differ-
ence is reflected in the goal setting of the regulations
in both countries.In Germany the goal is to maintain
the status quo of functions and values of all the habi-
tats and landscapes (in a dynamic sense). In the US
the goal is focused on no net loss of wetland habitats.
As a result of this legislation,three types of mitigation
schemes have developed.The first mitigation scheme
was permittee-responsible on-site mitigation, the so-
called “classic” mitigation, which occurs on a case-by-
case basis. In permittee-responsible on-site mitiga-
tion, the regulatory agency requires the permittee to
carry out compensatory mitigation measures on or
close to the impact site (on-site). This requirement
exists as a sub-condition or obligation of the impact
permit. For a long period of time, along with the pos-
sibility of making a cash donation, permittee-respon-
sible on-site mitigation was the only way to compen-
sate in both Germany and the US. As depicted in
Figure 1 there are two reciprocal transactions here.
The public authority as the agency for the general
public issues a permit and the developer is allowed to
cause an impact and is obliged to offset the damage.
* Federal Agency for Nature Conservation, Division Legal Affairs,
Economics and Ecologically Sound Regional Development. This
article reflects the personal views of the author.
** Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn.
1 National Research Council 2001.
2 International comparison of impact regulations (Peters et al. 2002;
Darbi et al. 2010).
3 Section 404 Clean Water Act, §15 Bundesnaturschutzgesetz
(BNatSchG).
4 There is no nationwide regulation in the US for all natural sites;
however, in addition to the wetland mitigation regulation under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act
requires mitigation for damages to endangered species habitats
other than wetlands.Later new forms of mitigation emerged and have
been used more and more often, as on-site mitiga-
tion gives rise to a number of problems, e.g., non-
compliance and lack of enforcement, time-lag ef-
fects,adverse effects from the neighboring or impact
site (with high development pressure) and often
questionable ecological value of the measures.
Mitigation measures can now also be carried out at
locations different from the impact site (off-site), in
advance of the impact and by third parties. Both the
primarily communally-operated mitigation pools in
Germany5 and the commercial wetland mitigation
banks in the US represent forms of off-site compensa-
tion pools. The local authorities in Germany operate
these mitigation pools primarily for impacts that occur
in their area of jurisdiction. By carrying out mitigation
measures on larger sites that serve to offset a number
of small impacts, they strive above
all for a simplified impact regulato-
ry process as well as for an envi-
ronmentally sound management of
compensation measures. The com-
munal mitigation pools therefore
serve primarily public non-profit
purposes.
For communal mitigation pools in
Germany, it is typical that the envi-
ronmental regulatory agency rec-
ognizes the procurement of mi-
tigation measures in pools before
the project is realized,even if this is
often done informally. (See the re-
lationship between pool operator
and regulatory agency in subtrans-
action 2 in Figure 2).The use of mit-
igation credits to meet the obliga-
tion of the permit (see subtransac-
tion 1) leads to a third subtransac-
tion between the permittee and the
pool operator. As mitigation pools
run by local authorities generally
issue the impact permit as well as
offer compensation measures to
the developer (permittee),the rela-
tion is generally not market-orient-
ed due to the lack of alternatives
for the permittee.
Commercial wetland mitigation banking in the US –
especially in Florida – involves private compensation
providers (third parties).They create so-called miti-
gation credits by restoring and maintaining wetlands
and sell them to permittees who thereby fulfill their
mitigation obligations. Wetland mitigation banks6
are large areas7 in which an off-site compensation
project can be conducted to compensate for numer-
ous impacts. This primarily involves the successful
implementation of compensation before the impacts
take place. Commercial wetland mitigation banking
represents a market-oriented form of compensation.
Commercial mitigation banks are characterized by
several interconnected partial transactions, as repre-
sented in Figure 3.
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5 Mitigation banks in Germany are in fact operated in some cases
by foundations or by profit-oriented companies. Communal miti-
gation pools are, however, more prevalent (Böhme et al. 2005). In
the following we will concentrate on these types to simplify the
comparison for German mitigation pools.
6 Definition:“A [wetland] mitigation bank is a site where wetlands
and/or other aquatic resources are restored, created, enhanced, or
in exceptional circumstances, preserved expressly for the purpose
of providing compensatory mitigation in advance of authorized
impacts to similar resources” (US Army Corps of Engineers/EPA
1995).
7 In Florida the average size of a wetland mitigation bank site is
over 1,000 hectares (Macke 2009).CESifo DICE Report 4/2011 43
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Before wetland mitigation banks can sell mitigation
credits, however, they must fulfill a number of pre-
requisites: they are required to clarify the project
details with the authorities, the Mitigation Banking
Review Team (MBRT), as part of an elaborate
approval process. Additionally, they are required to
provide financial securities and define (together with
the MBRT) the ecological achievement that is nec-
essary for the full credit approval. In general, the
authorities and the wetland mitigation banker agree
to a credit release schedule.With this, partial project
results can be sold upon verification before the final
realization of the project. The wetland mitigation
bankers are responsible for securing the achieve-
ments. Specific details are contractually fixed in the
mitigation banking instrument (the approval/permit
for banking).
Economic analysis of mitigation schemes
Using theses derived from New Institutional
Economics (Richter and Furubotn 2003; Picot et al.
2003 and 2005; Williamson 1985; 1990 and 2000) we
have compared these three compensatory mitigation
types in terms of their advantages and disadvan-
tages, thereby identifying characteristics that should
positively affect compliance and successful restora-
tion of functions and values of habitats lost by the
development projects they are meant to offset.8
New Institutional Economics is
primarily concerned with con-
tracts in which the obligations of
the parties are due at different
points in time or with other con-
tracts that define a certain se-
quence of obligations and there-
fore require time for their fulfill-
ment (Richter and Furubotn
2003). These characteristics are
typical for the coordination of
impacts and mitigation measures
as the time needed for comple-
tion of transaction is generally
long. The ecological compensa-
tion should exist as long as the
impact, with the time necessary
for the ecological development
resulting in a temporal diver-
gence between impact and compensation.The use of
new institutional economics to understand the provi-
sion of public goods and the relationship between
private and public agents can thereby increase
awareness of problems created by opportunism,
uncertainty and transaction costs (i.e., Bonus 1996).
However, new institutional economics are generally
applied to economic analyses of transactions be-
tween private stakeholders of private goods that are
above all distinguished by contracts (cp. Richter and
Furubotn 2003).The goal of compensation measures
is to enhance an area ecologically. No one is exclud-
ed from enhancement of this sort, and there is little
rivalry in consumption. Thus, the provision of com-
pensation measures can be called a public good
which, alongside the typically private polluter, re-
quires the engagement of a public authority. The
relationship between principal and agent is conse-
quently also not a contractual relationship in the
original sense.
If one considers, however, that the compensation
measure is exchanged for the issuance of the impact
permit, the relationship between the impact-permit-
ting public authority and the compensation provider
can be understood as an exchange relationship to
which the findings of the principal-agent (i.e.,
Richter and Furubotn) and transaction cost theory
(i.e., Williamson 1990; 2000) can be applied. A fur-
ther modification of contract theory to this type of
“exchange relationship” was therefore used for the
development of three theses on impact regulation.
They establish the basis for a comparative analysis of
the three mitigation schemes.
TRANSACTION IN THE WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING







8 A detailed description of these characteristics can be found in
Macke (2009).The influence of conflicts of interests
We derive our first thesis from the principal agent
theory:
The greater the conflict of interest between nature
protection agency and compensation provider is,
the more likely noncompliance and negative
external effects at the expense of the general pub-
lic are to occur.
The degree to which an agent achieves the goal of
a principal is not only determined by the agent’s
capabilities, but also by his interests. Only if the
regulatory agency is interested in nature conserva-
tion,will full compliance with the agency’s require-
ments also imply fulfillment of the goals of the
principal, the “general public”. And only if self-
interest in compliance can be generated by those
responsible for the mitigation action, can monitor-
ing costs of the regulatory agency be lowered.
Depending on the mitigation schemes, monitoring
costs will be born by the agent or by the principal.
Inspections, reporting and monitoring obligations
for the agents have a disciplinary effect on the
compensation provider.
German permittee-responsible compensatory mitigation
As is illustrated in Figure 4,in this mitigation scheme
a convergence of goals occurs between the impact-
permit issuing agency and the developer, as both are
interested in a minimization of the process costs,
whereas a greater conflict of interest exists between
the issuing agency and the nature conservancy agen-
cy, which we assume acts as the agent of the general
public. Before issuing the urban impact permit there
is an unequal power relationship between the public
agencies and the developer since the developer can
typically use the entire project as leverage in the
“negotiations” of specifying the mitigation obliga-
tions (measures) with the public authorities (espe-
cially using the argument of potential jobs otherwise
being created elsewhere), while public authorities
will not tend to endanger the entire project since it is
necessary to weigh all interests when planning urban
development. The conflict of interest between the
developer and the nature conservancy agency leads
to a higher risk of non-compliance especially regard-
ing long-term management of compensation sites,
once the permit is issued.
In classic compensatory mitigation the compensa-
tion provider is usually also the developer who has
no inherent interest in mitigation activities and their
ecological benefits, once he has received the permit.
This endangers compliance if monitoring can not be
implemented. Due to the fact that monitoring many
small sites is very costly, after initial construction,
controls, as has been shown empirically, are often
neglected. Furthermore the developer’s particular
capabilities as compensation provider are restricted
– if at all existent – in potential property rights on
surrounding areas,which can be used for on-site mit-
igation. We therefore conclude that commissioning
the developer as the compensation provider would
not increase efficiency.
Communal mitigation pools in
Germany
For communal mitigation pools in
Germany to function, the local
environmental protection agency
has to recognize the mitigation
pool areas of a mitigation pool op-
erator as potential sites for mi-
tigation to offset accruing impacts
(Figure 5). In general consulta-
tions between the mitigation pool
manager and the nature conserv-
ancy agency occur in a timely and
voluntary manner since this re-
duces possible conflicts at a later
date – when mitigation credits for
a certain impact project are debit-
ed – which the nature conservancy
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CONFLICTING AND CONVERGING OBJECTIVES IN
CLASSIC COMPENSATORY MITIGATION
Nature Conservancy Agency Permit Issuing Agency
General Public Developer (Permittee) 
Mitigation Provider
Source: Macke (2009).
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agency has the right to respond to as representative of
public interest.Another advantage of mitigation pools
for the nature conservancy agency is that, as long as
not all the credits are sold, the pool operator has an
interest in the mitigation measure’s success. Imple-
mentation quality is thereby guaranteed for the public
authorities with minimal administrative efforts.
Local authorities appreciate the availability of miti-
gation sites since a lack of compensation areas can
hamper development. For communal mitigation
pools,success is not a result of a directive of the rela-
tionship between the nature conservancy agency and
the local authority, rather it is following a coopera-
tive understanding.
The implementation of mitigation measures before
potential impacts, the approval of mitigation pools
and the possibility of refinancing when credits get
used often lead to a considerable acceleration of the
impact permit process. Both parties benefit from
this: the developer, who typically saves high costs
(opportunity costs as well as time savings in search-
ing for an area, developing a compensation concept,
etc.), and the permit-issuing agency, which benefits
from a simplified administrative impact permitting
process compared with permittee-responsible com-
pensatory mitigation. In addition, lower costs for pro-
tecting the mitigation area by ownership also arise
compared with on-site mitigation, since land prices
near the impact area are often higher than in other
locations due to the high development potential in
those areas. If mitigation credits
are produced in advance,the miti-
gation projects implementation is
guaranteed.
Nevertheless, communal mitiga-
tion pools carry new internal un-
certainty risks due to the hetero-
geneous goals of the participating
agencies and persons. Local au-
thorities, responsible for both the
impact permit and for providing
mitigation might be “biased” and
depending on the agencies in-
volved and their specific motiva-
tion and power, outcome might
differ. Especially in the bigger
German cities (kreisfreie Städte)
outcome depends strongly on the
quality of cooperation with the
local conservation agency (Unte-
re Naturschutzbehörde). Since mainly the munici-
palities decide on both impacts and mitigation
requirements, in the day-to-day routine they can uti-
lize a considerable legal range virtually uncontrolled
by the municipal supervisory bodies (Kommunalauf-
sicht; Macke 2009).The division of impact decisions
and compensation requirements is not clearly delin-
eated here,meaning that supply,demand and regula-
tion in the mitigation credit market within local au-
thorities are entangled, creating the conditions for
opportunistic behaviour to occur, possibly at the ex-
pense of nature-conservation goals (Macke 2009).
Commercial wetland mitigation banking in Florida
In commercial wetland mitigation banking a strong
convergence of goals exists between the mitigation
provider and the Mitigation Banking Review Team.
The mitigation banker would like to sell its service (the
ecological enhancement) and requires permission
from the Mitigation Banking Review Team.9 Since it
can only sell mitigation credits upon successful com-
pletion of a project,which is in the inherent interest of
the MBRT,both strive for the same goal in a result-ori-
ented manner, albeit for different motivations. The
permittee can acquit itself of its compensatory duties
and the associated implementation and long-term
management risks through the purchase of credits
(Figure 6).
CONFLICTING AND CONVERGING OBJECTIVES IN THE 
UTILIZATION OF COMMUNAL MITIGATION POOLS
Permit Issuing Agency Nature Conservation Agency
Developer (Permittee) 
Local Authority
(Municipal Mitigation Pool) 
Source: Macke (2009).
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9 MBRT with local representatives from US Corps of Engineers,
Environmental Protection Agency, US Fish and Wildlife Service
etc. (Macke 2009).This reduces the initial conflict of interests between
the developer and the regulatory agency, since for
the developer meeting mitigation obligations of the
regulatory agency by buying credits from a commer-
cial wetland mitigation bank is the simplest, fastest
and safest way.
Potential opportunistic behavior from both sides
(banking operator and MBRT) is institutionally inter-
cepted. There is exchange of information within the
mitigation banking review process. Further tools of
safeguarding are financial and legal guarantees for
the mitigation project, controlling and reporting
requirements, and the release of mitigation credits to
sell as soon as well- defined performance standards
are reached (Macke 2009). Details are written in the
Mitigation Banking Instrument (bank permit). With
this institutional design,the level of uncertainty is low.
In this mitigation scheme the specific capabilities of
the agents are also utilized beneficially. The profit-
oriented wetland mitigation bank operator generally
provides technical expertise, land areas and capital.
The influence of asset specific investments
Thesis 2 is derived from transaction cost economics:
The larger asset-specific investments and trans-
action hazards are the higher the transaction
costs to secure upfront-investments in a market
environment and the more efficient vertical
integration becomes.
In this case vertical integration is
equivalent to having the mitiga-
tion project provided by the pub-
lic authority or the community
itself.
A particular problem of oppor-
tunism is the potential concealing
of opposite intentions through a
transaction partner (hidden inten-
tion). In the context of asset-spe-
cific investments and their associ-
ated “sunk costs”, this becomes a
serious problem.This is because a
so-called hold-up problem10 aris-
es due to the asset-specificity of
the investment. The transaction
cannot be aborted without costs
and thus a dependence on the
transaction partner occurs. The
transaction partner can try to take advantage of this
dependence through opportunistic behavior and ap-
propriate the quasi-rent in renegotiations.This nega-
tively affects asset specific investments. As a result
asset specific upfront investments require an institu-
tional guarantee as soon as they occur in a market
(Erlei et al. 1999).
The hold-up problem – applied to the impact/com-
pensation situation – exists on the one hand when
the public authorities allow the impact to occur
before compensation.Then a developer,acting as the
compensation provider, can behave opportunistical-
ly and put the public authorities in an unfavourable
position, making it difficult for them to enforce mit-
igation. Safeguards are possible, but result in addi-
tional transaction costs. On the other hand, if the
compensation provider makes upfront investments
which can generally not be utilized otherwise, e. g.,
placing the mitigation site under conservation ease-
ment or by almost irreversible landuse changes, the
mitigation provider depends on the approval of pub-
lic authorities in order to sell its service to a third
party.Specificity furthermore arises from the spatial-
functional context.
Classic compensatory mitigation and communal mit-
igation pools in Germany
For the permittee-responsible mitigation, a certain
level of proximity between the impact and mitiga-
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10 Klein et al. (1978);Williamson (1985); Ewerhart (1997).CESifo DICE Report 4/2011 47
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tion is sought, concerning the location as well as
functional aspects. Since the site-specificity is ac-
cordingly high, this transaction is poorly suited for
market governance. Since mitigation measures are
generally carried out on-site and by the developers
themselves, this is an outsourced action from the
principals’ perspective (the general public/local au-
thorities).The high level of uncertainty regarding the
behavior of the agent in combination with asset-spe-
cific investments would conversely favour vertical
integration, meaning to in-source mitigation on be-
half of the public sector, as is the case in communal
mitigation pools. If frequency is high enough, as is
the case in most communities,an increase in efficien-
cy is thus to be expected from vertical integration,
e.g.,communal mitigation pools.But vertical integra-
tion comes at the price of considerably weakening
the on-site character (spatial proximity) as given in
the classical mitigation scheme. Furthermore, the
advantages of this scheme can also only be realized
under the assumption that the public sector negoti-
ates in the role of the principal, the general public.
As we have seen in thesis 1, this assumption should,
however, be viewed skeptically regarding multi-
objective decision making of communal authorities.
Commercial wetland mitigation banking in Florida
Wetland mitigation banking involves a regulated
market. The site-specificity for commercial wetland
mitigation banks is reduced in comparison with per-
mittee-responsible,on-site compensatory mitigation.
A wetland mitigation bank can compensate for a
number of adverse environmental impacts.However
this flexibility also has its limits:the spatial-function-
al context between impact and mitigation is limited
by defining the banks service area on a watershed
basis and by distinguishing various mitigation credit
types, depending on the habitats properties gained
(and lost).11
To obtain credits in wetland mitigation banks, the
bank operator has to invest his capital and time in
very asset-specific investments, protecting the com-
pensation area under conservation easement and
restoring wetlands. After the investment has taken
place, the wetland mitigation banker becomes de-
pendent on the authority’s decisions.Theoretically a
reverse agent-principal hold-up problem arises.
From the perspective of the regulatory agency or the
general public, this disciplines the mitigation pro-
vider and supports his self-interest in high quality.
From the perspective of the mitigation bank opera-
tor this dependency might deter investments. In the
wetland mitigation schemes this risk is institutional-
ly absorbed by the formal approval of the wetland
mitigation bank (Mitigation Banking Instrument as
a permit notification) in a very early phase.
Additionally, further measures exist that limit the
risk of the mitigation banker.This includes,above all,
the credit release schedule which allows the bank
operator to gradually sell a portion of the mitigation
credits (of the anticipated credit gaining potential of
the area/possible ecological lift) as soon as prede-
fined performance standards are reached. This al-
lows for advance income and thereby a certain level
of liquidity for the necessary investment. Since both
the wetland mitigation banker and the MBRT place
a significant amount of resources into the bank per-
mit process and thereafter maintain a mutual inter-
est in the continuing existence of the transaction re-
lationship (build-up reciprocity as a guarantee mech-
anism),this creates additional trust and a willingness
to cooperate.The agencies represented in the MBRT
also have an interest in a successful relationship in
the long-term since they have invested time and
other resources in the process in advance and would
like to ensure future benefits,such as decreased con-
trol efforts.
This type of governance seems to be well adjusted to
match the characteristics of the transactions in miti-
gation. Market coordination between the permittee
(developer) and the commercial wetland mitigation
banker using classic contracts is preferable, as costs
and bureaucratic efforts can be saved while market
transparency can be ensured with little effort (online
databases are available). Wetland mitigation banks
make economies of scale possible.These have advan-
tageous effects for the set-up costs of coordinating
and safeguarding (controlling) the transaction as
well as for the actual execution of the measure.
In summary,several factors indicate the efficiency of
market-oriented wetland mitigation banking as a
hybrid form of organization. These factors include
the comparatively low uncertainty due to implemen-
tation of mitigation measures before impacts, the
low risk of opportunism and the specific bilateral
investments of the transaction partners as well as the
moderate site-specificity. Though “on-site mitiga-
tion” is not possible with this approach, “in-kind”
11 Florida,for example,distinguishes four types of credits:saltwater,
freshwater, herbaceous and forested wetlands.mitigation is implemented to the extent that a water-
shed service area approach is applied and that vari-
ous types of wetland habitat credits are distinguished.
The influence of full cost internalization
Property rights theory is the basis for thesis 3:
Only if long-term enforcement of compensation
is guaranteed, will the permittee causing the
damage consider all of the costs and benefits
associated with his decision to develop.
Impact regulations create private costs of compensa-
tion (planning, mitigation measures and long-term
management),which are meant to reduce the external
costs of the impact.Therefore impact regulations can
also make the permittee consider the social costs of
his private decisions. If full compliance is achieved, in
theory the external effect is internalized. But as it is
costly to comply,compliance has to be monitored and
enforced. The different impact regulation schemes
discussed here use diverging approaches to do so.
Classic mitigation scheme Germany
In permittee-responsible compensatory mitigation
the polluter-pays-principle is implemented de jure
because the developer himself is required to com-
pensate the damage to the environment. However a
considerable de facto violation of the polluter-pays-
principle occurs because third parties (the general
public) bear the costs of governance as well as for
natural losses due to non-compliance. Empirical re-
sults show that in many cases compliance cannot be
enforced and therefore external costs cannot be in-
ternalized.
Commercial wetland mitigation banking Florida
In commercial wetland mitigation banking, on the
other hand, the polluter-pays-principle is carried out
to the greatest extent possible because the commer-
cial wetland mitigation banker transfers the entire
costs to the permittee (developer buying the cred-
its). Additionally, the wetland mitigation banker
bears the costs of failing projects (no credit release)
and upfront investments (no release of mitigation
credits/no appropriation of impact). Transaction
costs of approval and safeguarding, which remain
partly with the authorities, are not charged to the
developer. Compared with permittee-responsible
compensatory mitigation, these transaction costs are
considerable and strain the authorities and the gen-
eral public especially in the bank-approval process
(MBRT process). The cost-reduction effects of ap-
proved commercial wetland mitigation banks
achieved through the (ex post) inspections of few
large sites by the authorities together with the
reduced enforcement efforts by the authorities are,
however, positively assessed (Macke 2009).
Communal mitigation pools Germany
For communal mitigation pools in Germany, there
are considerable weaknesses in the implementation
of the polluter-pays-principle, since developers are
often not charged the full costs – due to a lack of po-
litical will or administrative difficulties. In addition,
refinancing as such is associated with considerable
bureaucratic efforts. Furthermore, due to budgetary
laws in Germany, management and overhead costs
often cannot be charged to the developer – a burden
that can significantly limit the establishment of com-
munal mitigation pools. In addition this weakens the
polluter-pays-principle.
Conclusions
The institutional economic analysis of existing impact
regulations in the US and Germany shows that many
reasons can be found to explain the disappointing
performance of permittee-responsible on-site mitiga-
tion.Though in theory this instrument could induce a
full internalization of costs,economies of scale in both
production and controlling cannot be realized with
this instrument. At the same time the incentive for
opportunistic behavior of the developer is very strong
after the impact permit is issued,resulting in high eco-
logical costs through noncompliance and poor imple-
mentation and insufficient long-term management.
If impact regulations are made more flexible, both
vertical integration (production by the authorities
through communal mitigation pools) and the use of
regulated markets become possible. Compared with
permittee-responsible on-site mitigation, off-site
pools reduce production and ecological costs, there-
by realizing economies of scale in ecological en-
hancements as well as in transaction costs (if fre-
quency of credit selling is not too low).These advan-
tages of an off-site pool are independent of the sup-
plier (public vs. private etc.).
Mitigation pooling through third parties (communal
pools and commercial wetland mitigation banks) has
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even more advantages. Agents with specialized
knowledge can be called upon, who have their own
interest in compensation and the success of the pro-
ject.As soon as profit-oriented third parties are inte-
grated into the process, opportunistic behavior is
anticipated by the authorities and – at least in the US
(Florida) – this is institutionally absorbed and safe-
guarded. The initial ecologically successful imple-
mentation is virtually guaranteed.
In Germany, opportunistic behavior by public pro-
viders has not been taken into consideration. As a
result there are few safeguards to protect against this.
Our analysis shows, however, that major conflicts of
interest require safeguards especially for communal
mitigation pools. Assuming that the same product
quality can be obtained from publicly and from pri-
vately operated pools,full cost internalization is ham-
pered by an obvious lack of full cost accounting in the
German communal mitigation pools.
Quality control is a crucial prerequisite for confi-
dence in the pooling approach, both for the general
public and the bank operator.12 The experience in
Florida demonstrates that an intensive market entry
process can limit the hold-up problem for the private
bank operator.The determination of ecological per-
formance standards for releasing mitigation credits
are likewise assessed positively. Asset-specific bilat-
eral upfront investments in the banks’ approval pro-
cess lead to mutual interest in the long-term success
of the mitigation project. The administration can
concentrate its resources on its regulatory functions.
The high debiting frequency leads in particular to
efficiency in set-up and safeguarding efforts. This
results in win-win-win situations between the regula-
tory agencies, the permittee (developer) and the
commercial provider of mitigation credits.
In comparing the three compensation schemes,
major problems with permittee-responsible compen-
satory mitigation have become apparent, as expect-
ed from the empirical results. The extent to which
market coordination as a type of governance struc-
ture is feasible depends on the strength of the on-site
preference of the authorities. Only if these are re-
duced, as is the case in Florida and partly in Ger-
many too,can municipal mitigation pools function as
a kind of vertical integration or a market-based solu-
tion similar to that in the US.A regulated market, as
witnessed in commercial wetland mitigation bank-
ing, is therefore the most preferable type of gover-
nance from the new institutional economics perspec-
tive with the caveat that utilizing safeguarding op-
tions against moral hazards are necessary.The Flori-
da case shows that this does not preclude a close
functional link to the habitats lost by the impact.
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